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ENDANGERED DEFERENCE: SEPARATION 
OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
AGENCY INTERPRETATION 
KATHRYN M. BALDWIN†
INTRODUCTION 
 
Donald Zarda, a skydiving instructor, did what he was paid 
to do: put a client at ease when tensions were running high 
before a big jump.  For Zarda, that meant disclosing he was gay 
to a female client whose boyfriend was teasing her about being 
closely strapped to a man.1  The boyfriend called Zarda’s 
employer to complain, and Zarda was subsequently fired.2  Zarda 
filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that he was fired 
for discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.3  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, bound by its precedent in Simonton v. Runyon,4 
affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the 
employer on that claim.5  While the Supreme Court has 
established a Title VII claim for “discrimination based on a 
failure to conform to ‘sex stereotypes,’ ”6 it has not recognized a 
“ ‘sex stereotype’ that men should date women.”7
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2018, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., Xavier University. With thanks to Professor Anita 
Krishnakumar for her support and invaluable insight and to the editorial board for 
their diligent and thorough work. 
  Based on the 
anomalous logic that a plaintiff alleging discrimination could 
prevail if she were a masculine woman but not if she were a  
 
1 Joseph Goldstein, Discrimination Based on Sex Is Debated in Case of Gay Sky 
Diver, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/nyregion 
/discrimination-based-on-sex-sky-diver-donald-zarda.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Zarda v. Altitude Express, 855 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2018)). 
4 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
5 Zarda, 855 F.3d at 79–80 (noting that a three-judge panel cannot overturn 
Second Circuit precedent). 
6 Id. at 80 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)). 
7 Id. at 81. 
AR2_BALDWIN 9/10/2018  12:41 PM 
92 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:91   
masculine woman who is also a lesbian, the Second Circuit 
granted a rehearing en banc to revisit the question of whether 
the term “sex” encompasses sexual orientation.8
At the rehearing, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), the agency charged with enforcing the 
Civil Rights Act, argued that Title VII’s prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of sex includes discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.
 
9  The agency first established this 
position in Baldwin v. Foxx,10 which was decided during the 
pendency of Zarda’s case and formed the basis for his appeal.11  
Using its unique vantage point to adjudicate anti-discrimination 
hearings across the country, the EEOC construed a notoriously 
ambiguous statute to fulfill its congressionally delegated duty.  
The Second Circuit’s en banc decision in Zarda cited the evolved 
position the EEOC took in the Baldwin case, and adopted its 
framework and analysis to hold that Title VII discrimination on 
the basis of sex includes sexual orientation.12
This is a critical issue to resolve, as states vary widely in 
their protections for LGBTQ workers, resulting in confusion and 
insecurity for employees.
   
13  As the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have reached 
divergent definitions of “sex,”14
 
8 Braden Campbell, 2nd Circ. Grants En Banc Rehearing on Gay Bias 
Precedent, LAW 360 (May 25, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles 
/928578/2nd-circ-grants-en-banc-rehearing-on-gay-bias-precedent. 
 the Second Circuit’s en banc 
interpretation reinforces a circuit split that primes the issue for 
eventual certification to the United States Supreme Court.  
While the Second Circuit found statutory protection for the 
LGBTQ workforce, its refusal to explicitly state that it was  
 
9 Goldstein, supra note 1 (noting that the Department of Justice argued against 
this reading). 
10 EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015). 
11 Zarda, 855 F.3d at 81. 
12 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15–3775,  slip op., at 8, 12–13, 21 (2d Cir, 
Feb. 26, 2018) (en banc). 
13 See German Lopez, The Equality Act, the Most Comprehensive LGBTQ Rights 
Act Ever, Explained, VOX (Nov. 10, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/ 
7/23/9023611/equality-act-lgbt-rights. 
14 Compare Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 350–51 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (“It would require considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from 
‘sexual orientation.’ ”), with Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255–57 
(11th Cir. 2017) (denying a claim under Title VII for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation). 
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persuaded by, or deferring to, the EEOC’s position was a missed 
opportunity to shed critical light on who is best positioned to 
interpret statutes: agencies or courts.15
Agencies set and enforce a wide variety of rules and 
regulations that bring the federal government inside the homes 
of Americans, affecting everything from our paychecks to our 
prescriptions to the foods in our pantries.  Since the inception of 
administrative agencies, courts and legislators have wrestled 
with agencies’ proper role in government, and how to 
appropriately cabin the scope of agency power.   
 
For over thirty years, courts have deferred to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute through the 
framework of the Chevron doctrine.  Subsequent judicial 
decisions have complicated this doctrine16 and questioned 
whether it amounts to a constitutional violation of separation of 
powers.17  Adding fuel to the fire is the bipartisan 
acknowledgment that the executive branch under President 
Obama expanded its authority, either to circumvent a gridlocked 
Congress,18 to further the President’s own agenda,19
 
15 Of note, the EEOC did not argue for deference to the agency’s position in its 
amici brief to the Second Circuit, sitting en banc. See En Banc Brief Amicus Curiae 
of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants 
and Reversal, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2017) (No. 15-3775). 
 or both.  As 
16See Linda D. Jellum, The Impact of the Rise and Fall of Chevron on the 
Executive’s Power to Make and Interpret Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 171–72 
(2012) (noting complications in the doctrine, categorical limitations in application, 
and a decline in its overall application). 
17 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“As in other areas of our jurisprudence concerning administrative 
agencies . . . we seem to be straying further and further from the Constitution 
without so much as pausing to ask why.”). 
18 See Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation's 
Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2323, 2384 (2013) (“When Congress is 
dysfunctional, the other branches of government tend to fill the vacuum.”). 
19 See, e.g., Emma Brown, Bipartisan Group of Senators Asks Obama to Rein in 
Education Department Proposals, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/11/03/senators-from-both-parties-ask-
obama-to-rein-in-education-department-proposals/?utm_term=.af9ec36d6881 
(Senators argued Obama-era regulations from the Education Department would 
undermine their goal of shifting power back to the states); Rebekah Mintzer, Obama 
Administration Champions Pay Equity, But Some Allege Overreach, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 
24, 2016, 5:50 AM), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/10/21/obama-administra 
tion-champions-pay-equity-but-some-allege-overreach/?slreturn=20161030135154; 
Alan Gomez, Obama Immigration Plan Will Challenge Agency, Applicants, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 1, 2014, 3:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014 
/12/01/obama-immigra 
AR2_BALDWIN 9/10/2018  12:41 PM 
94 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:91   
further evidence of Chevron’s growing unpopularity, Congress is 
considering a bill that would overturn agency deference.  In 
January 2017, the House passed a bill including the Separation 
of Powers Restoration Act (“SOPRA”) to curtail agency authority 
by eliminating agency deference, shifting the primacy of 
statutory interpretation to courts through de novo review of 
agency construction.20
This Note argues in defense of deference.  From a separation 
of powers perspective, this Note argues first that Congress 
should rely on its other legislative checks over agency 
rulemaking and interpretation rather than legislating a blanket 
standard of judicial review.  This Note next argues that while 
overruling Chevron is within the Supreme Court’s ambit, it 
should decline to do so.  A de novo review of agency 
interpretations would create its own separation of powers issues, 
and would destabilize the predictable backdrop against which 
lower courts, Congress, and agencies have operated for more 
than three decades.  Instead, the Court should incorporate post-
enactment legislative history as an indication of congressional 
intent, closely mirroring the agency’s own understanding of 
Congress’s will, and redistributing some interpretive power to 
Congress. 
 
This Note proceeds in four parts: Part I consists of a brief 
history21
 
tion-executive-action-preparations/19544657/; JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA 
COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41561, EPA REGULATIONS: TOO MUCH, TOO 
LITTLE, OR ON TRACK? (2016) (citing bipartisan criticism towards regulations 
promulgated by the EPA under the Obama Administration). 
 of the development of agency deference doctrine.  Part II 
examines the decline of deference from the perspective of all 
three branches of government: the overuse by the executive 
agency that catalyzed deference’s denouement, the underuse by 
the United States Supreme Court and renewed separation of 
20 See infra Part II.C. 
21 As Chevron is one of the most discussed cases in academic writing, only a 
broad summary of its origin is necessary.  See Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. 
Walker, Symposium, 30 Years of Chevron: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 
Foreword, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014) (“Chevron has been cited in over 
68,000 total sources available on Westlaw—including in over 13,500 subsequent 
judicial decisions, in over 41,000 court filings, and in nearly 12,000 law review 
articles and secondary sources.”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and 
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 
613 (1996) (“Chevron deference has preoccupied administrative law scholarship in a 
way few issues ever have.”). 
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powers challenges, and the parallel assault from Congress under 
the pending SOPRA.  Part III addresses the proposed de novo 
review standard and highlights the deficiencies in that solution, 
emphasizing instead the tools that Congress already employs to 
meaningfully check agency interpretations.  Part IV concludes 
with a suggestion to courts to better balance separation of powers 
not through de novo review, but by embracing congressional 
intent as exhibited in post-enactment legislative history. 
I. DEFERENCE DEVELOPS WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Agency rulemaking powers, including rules that interpret 
and construe statutory terms, are derivative powers, predicated 
on a grant of authority from Congress.  The Administrative 
Procedure Act outlines the scope of judicial review of agency 
decisions, including interpretive rulemaking.22  Pursuant to this 
review, a court may “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right.”23  Thus, where an agency’s construction of a statutory 
term exceeds the limits or language of the statute, the court may 
invalidate the agency’s rule.  If, however, Congress has expressly 
or impliedly left a gap for the agency to fill, it has not exceeded 
its delegated authority by filling in those gaps.  While “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is,”24
The Supreme Court first heeded an agency’s statutory 
interpretation in Skidmore v. Swift.
 courts incorporate the agency’s reasoned 
construction and expertise into their judicial review. 
25  Focusing on the 
administrator’s expertise, the Court gave “weight”26
 
22 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
 to 
administrative rulings, interpretations, and opinions based on 
the following factors: thoroughness, logic, consistency, and  
 
 
23 Id. § 706(2)(C). 
24 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
25 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
26 Peter Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron 
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012). 
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persuasiveness.27  Ultimately, the Skidmore Court held that 
administrative rulings should “guide applications for 
enforcement,” but were not “conclusive” or binding on the 
Court.28
Forty years later, the Court changed agency interpretation 
doctrine by announcing a new deference regime that built on 
Skidmore’s inclination for favoring agency expertise.
 
29  In 
Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council,30 the Court 
reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
construction of the term “stationary source” for equipment that 
produces emissions pursuant to the EPA’s mandate to regulate 
air pollution under the Clean Air Act.31  The Court developed a 
two-part test for judicial review of agency statutory 
construction.32  First, where “Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue,” its “unambiguously expressed intent” 
controls.33  If, however, Congress is “silent or ambiguous,” then 
the Court must determine if the agency’s interpretation “is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”34  The agency in 
question need not be the only body interpreting the statute, nor 
does the Court need to independently reach the same reading; if 
the statute is silent or ambiguous, the agency’s reasonable 
interpretation governs.35
When Chevron solidified an agency’s interpretative primacy 
over statutes, it directly addressed separation of powers 
concerns.  The Court expressed its intent to avoid deciding 
 
 
27 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
28 Id. at 139. 
29 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 
969, 980 (1992) (describing Chevron as “a significant shift in the deference doctrine,” 
but stopping short of a “complete revolution”). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008) 
(“[T]he Chevron regime . . . plays a surprisingly modest role in the Court’s deference 
jurisprudence.”); Shane & Walker, supra note 21, at 494 (noting the “big deal” effect 
of Chevron is most notable outside of the courts). 
30 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
31 Id. at 840. The EPA’s rule provided for a “bubble” that included the entire 
plant within the stationary source, which environmental groups challenged as being 
too lenient on polluters. See id. The Court of Appeals set aside the regulation, and 
“adopt[ed] a static judicial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had 
decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition.” Id. at 842. 
32 Id. at 842–43. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 843. 
35 Id. at 843 n.11 
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among permissible interpretations based on “competing political 
interests,” stating that the Executive Branch is the appropriate 
actor to make policy decisions because the President, unlike the 
judiciary, is “directly accountable to the people.”36  Federal 
judges, having no constituency, should “respect legitimate policy 
choices” of the actors who do.37  Chevron pivoted towards 
dynamic statutory interpretation as a necessary outgrowth of the 
modern administrative state and extended Skidmore to its logical 
conclusion: heed the wisdom of expert, political actors who create 
technical rules to interpret and properly administer increasingly 
complex laws.38  Chevron cemented itself as the dominant 
doctrine to guide statutory interpretation in an increasingly 
agency-driven government,39
II. DEFERENCE IN DANGER AND THE PIVOT TOWARDS DE NOVO 
REVIEW 
 as the growing complexity and 
technicality of the administrative state requires an executive-
legislative blend to nimbly create and enforce the rules, 
guidelines, and regulations for a functioning modern 
government. 
This Part examines deference’s destiny from three 
perspectives.  First, it analyzes the Obama administration’s 
increased use of executive authority and robust agency action 
that perhaps catalyzed the other branches’ rebuke of agency 
deference.  Next, it looks at the United States Supreme Court’s 
underutilization of deference doctrines and the growing chorus of 
criticism.  Finally, this Part discusses Congress’s reaction to a 
perceived power shift among the branches by proposing SOPRA. 
A. Executive Expansion of Agency Action 
The growing presidential reliance on the administrative 
state contextualizes the Court’s and Congress’s changing 
 
36 Id. at 865–66.   
37 Id. at 866. 
38 Deference to expertise is neither novel nor exclusive to administrative law. 
For example, the Business Judgment Rule recognizes a lack of institutional 
confidence in the judiciary compared to the expertise of a director on a corporate 
board. The Business Judgment Rule is a judicial presumption deferring to a decision 
made by the board of directors of a corporation acting within their authority, so long 
as the directors have acted in accord with their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and 
good faith. See Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776, 778–80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
39 The cracks in the foundation will be addressed infra Part II. 
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response to agency deference.  Bureaucratic control described as 
the “administrative presidency” dates back to the Reagan 
administration.40  Each modern administration has developed 
different tactics for maximizing executive control over agencies.41
In particular, President Obama exercised a robust executive 
authority to make significant policy changes outside of the 
purview of the legislative branch.
   
42  One explanation for 
President Obama’s amplified agency and executive rulemaking is 
the ineffectiveness of the gridlocked Congress in office during 
most of his tenure.  An entrenched, partisan Congress is unable 
to form the necessary level of consensus on potentially 
controversial or broad policy and lacks the political will and votes 
to pass legislation drafted with specificity.43  To accomplish policy 
reform, the Obama administration circumvented the legislative 
process to offer rules on climate change,44 immigration,45 and 
civil rights issues.46
 
40 Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative 
Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 577 
(2011). 
   
41 Id. at 605–07 (describing President Reagan’s strategy, later adopted by 
President George W. Bush, to fill agency appointments and restructured positions to 
“alter[ ] the career-appointee balance in many agencies,” while the Clinton 
Administration inserted White House staff into regulatory review and exerted 
pressure on agency heads to promulgate rules that conform with presidential policy 
choices (quoting DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: 
POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 52 (2008))). 
42 Supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
43 Cf. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the 
Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 208 (2013) (“Polarization is 
already leading to an increase in the power of the Court against Congress, whether 
or not the Justices affirmatively seek that additional power.”). 
44 Coral Davenport, Obama Plans New Rule to Limit Water Pollution, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/us/politics/obama-set-to-
strengthen-federal-role-in-clean-water-regulation.html?_r=0 (“The water rule is part 
of a broader push by President Obama to use his executive authority to build a 
major environmental legacy, without requiring new legislation from the Republican-
controlled Congress.”). 
45 See Gomez, supra note 19. 
46 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. & U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague 
Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa 
/file/850986/download (announcing that the term “sex” in Title IX legislation, schools 
receiving federal funding must allow students to use restrooms “consistent with 
their gender identity”). The Trump administration is similarly frustrated by 
congressional stalemates, and continues to use executive orders and agency 
decisions to circumvent stalled or failed legislative action, most notably in the 
synthetic repeal of the Affordable Care Act. Robert Pear, Maggie Haberman, & Reed 
Abelson, Trump to Scrap Critical Healthcare Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again, 
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Some critics argue that President Obama, assuming 
deference to agency action, took advantage of the doctrine to 
expand executive branch influence and policy-making control.47  
Importantly, the polarization of political parties affects agency 
oversight shared between Congress and the President.48  Leaders 
on both sides of the aisle take umbrage with the increase in 
power of the executive branch during the Obama 
administration,49 yet it is predominantly right-wing members of 
Congress50 and Republican-appointed justices on the Supreme 
Court51
B. The Court Cools on Deference Without Overturning Chevron 
or Auer 
 who criticize and rally against the aggrandizement of 
agency authority.  Against this backdrop of increased executive 
branch action, deference meets its downfall in the other two 
branches. 
The Supreme Court fails to exercise deference when 
appropriate, applying Chevron to just one in four eligible cases, 
whittling down the interpretive domain of agencies.52
 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/trump-
obamacare-executive-order-health-insurance.html. 
  The series 
47 Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, How the President Came to 
Embrace Executive Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2016, at A1 (“[H]is exercise of 
administrative power expanded and cemented a domestic legacy that now rivals 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society in reach and scope.”). This is a large departure 
from early agency action, where President Obama issued executive orders to 
streamline agencies and reduce administrative redundancy, and called on federal 
agencies to use behavioral science to become more practical and effective. See Cass 
R. Sunstein, Making Government Logical, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20 2015, at 9(L). 
48 See Michael A. Livermore, Political Parties and Presidential Oversight, 67 
ALA. L. REV. 45, 97 (2015). For example, President Obama’s controversial use of 
recess appointments likely influenced the erosion of Congress’s trust in agency 
decisions, as legislators were threatened by the loss of a key oversight opportunity. 
See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2555–56 (2014). 
49 Appelbaum & Shear, supra note 47 (“The administration’s regulatory legacy 
has become an issue in the campaign to replace Mr. Obama. . . . ”). 
50 See David Hawkings, Article One: The Right’s Recipe for a Hill Revival, CQ 
MAG., Apr. 4, 2016. 
51 See infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text. 
52 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1293, 1300 (2016) (describing the inconsistencies of the Court in applying Chevron). 
The Court applies Auer even less frequently, affording deference “in a mere 7.1% of 
eligible cases.” Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1104 (covering Court decisions 
from 1984–2006). See also Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole 
Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 670 (2015). This dearth of deference might be 
explained by an overlap of available doctrines, including Chevron, but most Auer-
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of exceptions limiting the application of Chevron deference has 
crippled the doctrine’s legitimacy and use, and contrary to its 
original purpose, has created an unpredictable body of law. 
Three considerations explain why the Court decides not to 
defer to agency construction of ambiguous statutes or 
regulations.  First, exceptions are often based on the formal 
process of rule-making.53  The scholar-termed “Chevron Step 
Zero” ignores an agency’s construction when it lacks the “force of 
law” or was the product of informal procedures.54  Second, the 
Court recognizes the spectrum of complexity or technicality 
among statutes and rewards agencies interpreting technical 
statutes based on expertise necessarily beyond the Court’s 
institutional ken.55  Further, some enabling statutes explicitly 
prescribe the standard of judicial review, leaving less room for 
courts to defer to agency decisionmakers.56  Finally, politics could 
explain the inconsistencies in whether Chevron is applied and, 
when it is, which agency interpretations are upheld.  Arguably, 
the selective application of deference is a proper check on 
politicized agency rule-making.57  Realistically, ideological voting 
plagues Supreme Court administrative case law.58
 
eligible cases are afforded no deference at all.  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 
1104. Compare Eskridge & Baer, supra note 28, at 1125, with Kent Barnett & 
Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (2017) 
(“[C]ircuit courts applied the Chevron framework in . . . 74.8%[ o]f interpretations, 
[and] the agency prevailed . . . 77.4% [of the time].”).  
  It is very  
 
53 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 51, at 14 (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 
1449–50 (2005)). 
54 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 218 (2006); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 756–
57 (2014). 
55 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1144–45 (noting that at the Supreme 
Court level, energy and intellectual property interpretations prevail 93.3% and 
88.2% of the time, respectively, closely followed by foreign affairs and national 
security, bankruptcy, business regulation, tax, and entitlement programs, whereas 
civil rights interpretations succeed only 61.0% of the time). 
56 See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2015) 
(describing how Congress reacted to preemption decisions by the Office of 
Comptroller of the Currency by setting a specific, lower level of Skidmore deference 
in the Dodd-Frank Act to show it had lost confidence and respect for the agency). 
57 See Pierce, supra note 52, at 1309. 
58 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1156 (noting in an empirical study a 
pronounced agreement-rate differential based on liberal or conservative agency 
interpretations, where “the best indicator of whether the agency will win in any 
given case is the ideological characterization of the agency interpretation”). 
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likely that the Court splits along ideological lines deciding a 
policy decision on the merits, then works backwards to determine 
whether application of deference supports the end result.59
The re-emergence of the “Major Question Doctrine” in King v. 
Burwell
 
60 is a paradigmatic example of how a politicized Court 
approaches Chevron.  The Major Question Doctrine declines to 
apply Chevron deference for significant policy questions.61  In 
King, the Court stated that the availability of tax credits for 
federally established exchanges under the Affordable Care Act 
was “a question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that 
is central to this statutory scheme” not meant for the IRS to 
interpret without an express assignment from Congress.62  Even 
without applying Chevron, the Court ultimately agreed with the 
IRS’s construction,63 leading critics to believe that the Court 
needlessly jettisoned the doctrine while achieving the ends-
focused result it intended all along.64
Background policy preferences may have led four members of 
the Court to entertain the idea of overturning some aspect of 
agency deference during President Obama’s tenure.  Chief 
Justice Roberts first questioned agency deference as a violation of 
separation of powers in a dissenting opinion for City of Arlington 
v. FCC.
 
65
 
59 See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How 
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 
779, 839 (2010). 
  In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized the 
60 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  
61 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2000); 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994).  
62 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
63 Id. at 2496. 
64 See Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the "Major Questions" Doctrine, 5 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 498–99 (2016); Vanessa L. Johnson, Marisa Finley 
& J. James Rohack, King v. Burwell: The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity to 
Cure What Ails Chevron, 42 J. LEGIS. 101, 131–32 (2016); see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky, SCOTUS Gets Another Look at the Affordable Care Act, ABA JOURNAL 
(Feb. 25, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerisnky_ 
scotus_gets_another_look_at_the_affordable_care_act (noting the correlation 
between partisan appointment and lower court judges’ determination of whether to 
uphold the Affordable Care Act). 
65 569 U.S. 290, 312 (2013) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting); See Andrew M. 
Grossman, City of Arlington v. FCC: Justice Scalia's Triumph, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
331, 332 (2013).  In City of Arlington, state and local governments challenged a 
declaratory ruling issued by the FCC that limited their authority for zoning wireless 
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need for judicial authority against an unruly and all-
encompassing administrative state.66  Nevertheless, the majority 
opinion of the Court upheld the agency’s ruling, applied Chevron, 
and declined to grapple with questions raised in the case about 
the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.67  The majority even went 
so far as to describe de novo review as “an invitation to make an 
ad hoc judgment regarding congressional intent.”68
Justice Thomas has also questioned agency deference, 
writing separately in Michigan v. EPA
   
69 to directly challenge the 
constitutionality of Chevron deference.70  In Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Ass’n,71 he argued that deference to agency decisions 
“undermines [the Court’s] obligation to provide a judicial check 
on the other branches, and it subjects regulated parties to 
precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”72  In 
the same case, Justice Scalia indicated a willingness to overturn 
the Seminole Rock or Auer doctrine affording deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations,73 and Justice Alito 
also indicated his interest in reviewing the constitutionality of 
the Auer doctrine, though not on the facts of that case.74
 
telecommunication antennae and tower sites, claiming the ruling was outside the 
bounds of the FCC’s statutory authority. 569 U.S. at 294–95 (majority opinion). 
  In the 
last five years, conservative Justices have planted seeds of doubt 
about the prudence and constitutionality of deference, and their 
congressional counterparts are harvesting them, intent on 
dismantling the primacy of agency interpretation. 
66 City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 313–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that 
presidential oversight is not enough to keep agencies in check and warning against 
“the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state”). 
67 Id. at 304 (majority opinion) (noting that forcing a jurisdictional question is 
an attack not on the agency’s authority, but rather “the ultimate target . . . is 
Chevron itself”). 
68 Id. at 307. 
69 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
70 Id. at 2713–14. 
71 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
72 Id. Although that decision focused on interpretations of agency regulations, 
Chevron is necessarily implicated in the broad sweep of Justice Thomas’s 
constitutional concerns. See id. at 1217. 
73 Id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The agency is free to interpret its own 
regulations with or without notice and comment; but courts will decide—with no 
deference to the agency—whether that interpretation is correct.”). 
74 Id. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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C. Congress Seeks to Legislate the Standard of Review for the 
Court 
Like the Court, the efforts to override deference from 
Congress are driven by conservatives making a broad push to 
enhance the power of the legislature.75  While this might be 
consistent with party ideology to deregulate and shrink the 
federal government, it is impossible to ignore that the political 
underpinnings of a hegemonic struggle are a driving force behind 
a congressional body with obstructionist tendencies.76
Unwilling to wait for the Court to overturn Chevron and 
Auer, members of Congress seek to achieve the same end by 
mandating a judicial standard of de novo review for all matters of 
agency interpretation in SOPRA.
 
77  At the start of the new term, 
SOPRA was repackaged as Title II of The Regulatory 
Accountability Act of 2017, which passed in the House in 
January 2017.78
The House Judiciary Committee Report on SOPRA
 
79 
emphasizes the importance of democratic accountability and calls 
on members of Congress to sharpen their writing in arms against 
a runaway administrative state.  In explaining the need for 
SOPRA, legislators argue that agency deference is a “slippery 
slope” that will lead to uncertainty in the law based on the 
whims of agency interpretations.80
 
75 See Hawkings, supra note 49 (describing the fear that “Congress has become 
the dullest point on the federal triangle” as animating the group’s initiatives). 
  They further argue that the 
effect of deference is bad for Congress’s accountability in writing 
comprehensive and clear statutes, noting that “the modern 
administrative state is characterized by poor and gauzy 
legislation in which gaps and ambiguities are too often left 
intentionally by Congress, to be filled by unaccountable agency 
76 See 163 CONG. REC. H324 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 2017) (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte) (remarking that “[t]he Obama Administration abused regulation to force 
its will on the American people” and that regulatory reform, including SOPRA, 
would give the incoming Trump Administration the “tools” to end “abusive 
regulation”). 
77 H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016). 
78 H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 202 (2017) (proposing amendments to 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
The following July, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the Separation of Powers 
Restoration Act of 2017 to the Senate. S. 1577, 115th Cong. (2017). 
79 STAFF OF H. JUDICIARY COMM., 114TH CONG., REP. ON SEPARATION OF 
POWERS RESTORATION ACT OF 2016 (Comm. Print 2016). 
80 Id. at 4. 
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officials, whose work in turn is facilitated by deference from 
unaccountable judges.”81  The report does not address how de 
novo review will encourage better drafting from Congress.82
Also absent from the committee report, but likely not from 
drafters’ minds, is the concern that Chevron could unfairly 
heighten the hurdle for statutory abrogation.  When a court 
exercising interpretive primacy construes a statute contrary to 
Congress’s intent, Congress can amend or legislate around the 
decision.
 
83  By contrast, when a court upholds an agency’s 
unintended interpretation, any corrective legislation would be 
more likely to face presidential veto for the sake of consistent 
policies within the executive branch, effectively requiring a 
super-majority to override both the misinterpretation and veto,84
III. DE NOVO REVIEW IS NOT AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION 
 
further insulating the agency’s interpretation from oversight.  
Even fully crediting Congress’s concerns as accurately identifying 
the weaknesses of deference doctrines, their proposed solution, de 
novo review, will only exacerbate these problems. 
It is unlikely that either the Regulatory Reform Act of 2017 
or SOPRA will be enacted.85
 
81 Id. at 5. Ironically, the bill would cut out the middleman, leaving the 
statutory interpretation up to “unaccountable judges” alone.  As discussed supra 
notes 36–38, democratic accountability was a primary concern of the Chevron Court. 
  Regardless of their viability, this 
Note will proceed to examine why de novo review, which the 
United States Supreme Court could impose by overturning 
Chevron, is ill-suited for agency interpretations.  First, Congress 
has other legislative powers to check agency overreach.  Second, 
de novo review would undermine the ideologies behind 
82 Nor does the Committee Report acknowledge any of the necessities of vague 
drafting, including bounded rationality and the difficulties of compromise across a 
staggeringly deep partisan divide. 
83 See Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the Proposed “Separation of 
Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Jul. 26, 
2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deference-proposed-separation-
powers-restoration-act-2016-sign-times. 
84 See id. 
85 Even in a single-party controlled government, PredictGov estimates the bill 
has a 45% chance of being enacted. GOVTRACK, H.R. 5: Regulatory Accountability Act 
of 2017, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr5 (last visited March 18, 2018). 
Additionally, similar attempts to set blanket standards of review have failed. See 
Barnett, supra note 56, at 52. (“Congress’s failure to pass a judicial-review statute of 
general application since the APA in 1946 suggests that an omnibus statutory 
response is unlikely to succeed.”). 
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separation of powers.  Finally, deference doctrines are functional 
and relied upon by lower courts, Congress, and agencies, and 
should be maintained for consistency and predictability of law. 
A. Congress Can Achieve Agency Oversight Through Legislative 
Action 
SOPRA is unnecessary to achieve congressional oversight 
over administrative agencies, as Congress has both ex ante and 
ex post means to limit agency overreach.  Ex ante, Congress 
could draft legislation with greater specificity, delineating agency 
authority and designating the level of judicial review on a rule-
by-rule or agency-by-agency basis.86  Yet given the realities of 
current drafting practices, including an increased use of omnibus 
legislation,87 the need to reconcile committees and drafters with 
divergent interests,88 and the effect of the budget score in 
allowing ambiguity to prevail in a given statute,89 relying on 
Congress to draft statutes with enhanced precision seems an 
unlikely, if not impossible, solution.  Instead, Congress develops 
a robust and descriptive legislative history for agencies to use as 
an interpretive tool as they construe their delegated authority.90
 
  
However, these solutions fail to influence agency interpretation 
of prior enacted statutes or an agency’s own rules and guidelines.  
For those issues, Congress turns to its ex post administrative 
oversight powers. 
 
86 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (“Congress knows to 
speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and in capacious terms when it 
wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.”); see also Barnett, supra note 56, at 53 
(arguing for a systematic codification of judicial review for already-existing statutes 
in reauthorization and appropriations bills). 
87 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: 
Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 761 (2013) (“[T]he use of [this] ‘unorthodox’ vehicle[ ] 
is on the rise and . . . the rise is attributable to increased polarization.”). 
88 Id. at 756. 
89 Id. at 764. 
90 See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An 
Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 716 (2014) (showing agency 
awareness and use of legislative histories in statutory interpretation); Kevin M. 
Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, 109 
NW. U. L. REV. 871, 884 (2015) (arguing that because agencies participate in drafting 
legislative histories, they are more acutely aware of the drafting process and thus 
better equipped to utilize legislative histories than courts). 
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Congress cabins agency overreach and encourages agency 
interpretations to conform to Congressional intent through three 
powers.91  First, and most potent, Congress exercises the power of 
the purse through appropriations.92  Congress signals its 
interpretive preferences to agencies using appropriations in three 
ways: passing riders and earmarks,93 enacting authorizing 
legislation,94 and reducing the overall budget of the agency.95  
Some agencies are statutorily established to be self-funded and, 
therefore, are outside of Congress’s budgetary control.96  As such, 
the legislature—specifically the Senate—would have to rely on 
its second tool, the appointment process, to vet agency leaders on 
specific policy positions and send a strong prescriptive signal to 
the President on those policies.97  Appointments are a less 
effective means of control than the budget, as they theoretically 
occur less frequently than annual appropriations bills, and are a 
speculative and unpredictable way to determine future agency 
action.98
 
91 For a comprehensive analysis of Congress’s active participation in 
administering laws, see generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006). 
  Third, Congress can use both formal processes, such as 
92 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. I § 9, cl. 7; Note, Independence, 
Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The Impact of 
Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV L. REV 1822, 
1825 (2012) (“Agencies are entirely dependent upon Congress . . . for funding.”). 
93 Note, supra note 92, at 1826 (explaining that riders, which the Court treats 
like legislation, prohibit the use of funding for specific purposes, and are “temporary, 
narrowly focused amendments to the underlying statute,” while earmarks 
specifically designate funding). 
94 Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and 
Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 200 (1998) (“[M]ost federal 
agencies pay constant attention to their authorizing and appropriating committees, 
and they do very little of significance without clearing—or at least informing—the 
relevant committees.” (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Non-Judicial Checks on 
Agency Actions 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 195 (1997))). 
95 See Note, supra note 92, at 1827–28 (noting that while it is possible for the 
President to exercise control over the budget, using a veto to get more money for an 
agency is a weak power). 
96 See id. at 1823–24. 
97 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2; Developments in the Law—Presidential 
Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2135 (2012); Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, 
Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1625–26 (2015). 
98 Cf. Ian Ostrander, Senate Democrats are Battling Every Trump Nomination. 
Here’s How That Can Hurt Trump’s Policies, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/15/senate-
democrats-are-battling-every-trump-nomination-heres-how-that-hurt-trumps-
policies/?utm_term=.46b9043e8117 (arguing that delaying appointments has a large 
effect on an agency’s ability to execute its policy aims). 
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oversight hearings99 and committee reports, and informal 
contacts and statements to indicate its preference towards 
specific policies.100
Congress, of course, already employs these tactics.  For 
example, legislators have used budget cuts, riders to 
appropriation bills, and Senate refusal to confirm a permanent 
director to prevent the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (“ATF”) from carrying out specific policy goals, such as 
creating a federal registry for firearm transactions.
 
101  Congress 
has effectively hamstrung the ATF with a combination of 
exclusively legislative actions, underscoring the power of the 
legislative branch to oversee agency decision making.102
B. Deference Serves Separation of Powers Interests 
  
However, where Congress remains unsatisfied with the 
discretion exercised by the agency after it has exhausted all of its 
opportunities to influence the executive branch, judicial review is 
its last hope. 
De novo review strays further away from the goals of 
separation of powers by shifting policy-making power to the 
judiciary, effectively subverting democratic accountability and 
undermining the economic exercise of judicial authority.  In 
Chevron, the Court emphasized the necessity of allowing 
agencies and administrators who are beholden to the President, 
an officer elected by the entire country, to make policies.103  Some 
critics argue that presidential oversight delegitimizes agency 
choices.104
 
99 See Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and 
Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 28, 
42 (2011) (arguing that oversight hearings are an important, legitimate, and 
effective way to elicit a change in bureaucratic response post-hearing). 
  If the electorate is dissatisfied with the way the 
100 Beermann, supra note 91, at 70 (“All of the informal congressional action 
directed at agencies takes place in the context of (often unspoken) threats that 
Congress (or a particularly powerful member or committee) will not cooperate with 
the executive branch in the future.”). 
101 Erica Goode & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Legal Curbs Said to Hamper A.T.F. in 
Gun Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/26/ 
us/legislative-handcuffs-limit-atfs-ability-to-fight-gun-crime.html. 
102 See id. (noting that the NRA encouraged Congress to take these actions). 
103 Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). 
104 See Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President's Statutory Authority 
over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2479–80 (2011) (noting the opacity of 
the White House’s policy decision-making process). 
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President and agency develop policies, the Court conscientiously 
chose deference to prioritize political accountability, something 
that federal judges with lifetime appointments lack by design.  
Interpretation is an inherently political task, as it affects 
substantive policy outcomes.     
Where critics of deference argue that agency deference 
aggrandizes executive branch power at the expense of Congress, 
a shift to de novo review similarly expands judicial power by 
ensuring a branch purportedly unable to make policy decisions in 
effect controls policy outcomes.  This judicial power-grab is most 
obvious in the Major Question Doctrine.  Rather than defer to 
agency decisions, judges make policy choices in de novo review.105
Similarly, deference promotes institutional confidence by 
allowing experts to regulate.
  
Such interpretations infringe on the power of the legislative and 
executive branches to make and determine policy, and encourage 
an independent and unaccountable branch to take on that role. 
106  Once a court determines that a 
statute is ambiguous, it “ha[s] naught else to do beyond either 
nakedly choosing [its] own policy preferences or assessing 
whether the agency’s choice seems reasonable.”107  The more 
deference is afforded to agencies, the more expertise will be 
utilized, resulting in more reasoned and precise policy 
decisions.108  Technical decisions without the appropriate 
expertise are judgments built on sand that erode the potency of 
the Court’s rulings.109
Moreover, empowering agencies’ decisions also allows the 
Court to give effect to Congress’s delegation of power.  In this 
way, the Court is acting as the “faithful agent[]” of the 
 
 
105 See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
106 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (reasoning that the agency or administrator’s 
interpretation is entitled to deference where the “regulatory scheme is technical and 
complex,” the interpretation evidences a “detailed and reasoned” consideration by 
the agency, “and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”). 
107 Kristin E. Hickman, The Proposed Separation of Powers Restoration Act: 
Why? 41 A.B.A. SEC. OF ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 7 (2016). 
108 See Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Expertise in 
Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1097, 1141 (2015). 
109 Even if the Court relied on scientists, economists, or other analysts to inform 
its opinions, recreating the work of capable administrators would waste time and 
taxpayer dollars. 
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legislature110
C. Reliance Interests Favor Maintaining the Deference Status 
Quo 
  by carrying out its will to empower agencies to fill 
in the gaps in legislation.  Thus, de novo review would 
aggrandize judiciary discretion without any payoff for Congress 
in either enhanced expertise or fidelity. 
While many commentators have called for Chevron’s death 
at the hands of the United States Supreme Court,111
First, agencies depend on the stability of the Chevron regime 
to guide their interpretations.  Agency rulemakers are aware of 
Chevron and consider its use more than any other tool in 
drafting.
 agencies, 
lower courts, and Congress assume that deference applies to 
agency decisions and act accordingly.  The reliance on Chevron 
extending across all branches of the federal government should 
give the Court pause when it considers overruling the doctrine. 
112  De novo review would result in “delay, complexity, 
and uncertainty in the administrative process.”113
Second, lower courts consistently and successfully rely on the 
doctrine.  While the Supreme Court applies Chevron to roughly 
25% of the relevant cases, circuit courts apply Chevron to 74.8% 
of interpretations.
 
114
 
110 For more on faithful agency, see John F. Manning, Textualism and the 
Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).  But see Amy Coney Barrett, 
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 169 (2010) (noting 
instead, judges are “faithful agents of the Constitution.”). 
  At the Supreme Court level, “the Court’s 
choice to apply Chevron deference, as opposed to a less-
deferential doctrine or no deference at all, does not seem to affect 
111 See generally Beermann, supra note 91; Cory R. Liu, Chevron’s Domain and 
the Rule of Law, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 391 (2016); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining 
Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of 
Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239 (2002); Connor 
N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An 
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1727 (2010). 
112 Walker, supra note 90 at 716, 724 (noting 94% of rule drafters knew Chevron 
by name, and offering “some support for the empirical assumption that federal 
agencies draft differently when they know Chevron deference applies”). 
113 STAFF OF H. JUDICIARY COMM., 114TH CONG., REP. ON SEPARATION OF 
POWERS RESTORATION ACT OF 2016 23–24 (Comm. Print 2016) (dissenting views) 
(describing effect of de novo review as a “regulatory paralysis”). 
114 Barnett & Walker, supra note 52, at 4, 29. 
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the outcome of the case.”115  By contrast, at the circuit court level, 
“[t]he agency was twice as likely . . . to prevail . . . as opposed to 
reviewing the interpretation de novo . . . .”116  Perhaps de novo 
review would not increase the arbitrariness of Supreme Court 
decisions, where the application of a deference standard does not 
seem to affect the outcome of the case.  However, deference 
matters in lower courts, and contributes to the predictability and 
consistency of decisions.  Some scholars have questioned whether 
it is necessary for the Supreme Court to be uniform in its own 
application of Chevron and the instructions it provides to lower 
courts.117  The Supreme Court’s exceptions and inconsistent 
applications trickle down to circuit courts,118
Third, congressional drafting depends, in part, upon 
legislators relying on deference doctrines as a backdrop.  Unique 
among interpretive canons, Congress “consider[s] 
Chevron . . . when drafting precisely because [it] understand[s] 
that courts use [it].”
 and a doctrinal 
schism would give the Supreme Court a license to arbitrarily 
decide if and how Chevron applies to the few cases where it does 
grant certiorai.  Imposing de novo review at all levels of the 
judiciary would gut lower courts of a predictable and reliable tool, 
and “fix” a problem that does not exist outside of the Supreme 
Court. 
119  Unifying the approximately 12,000 
congressional staffers to conform with the Supreme Court’s 
notion of grammar canons would prove difficult.120  Congress 
exemplified its understanding of Chevron when it codified 
deference standards in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).121
 
115 Id. at 4. When the Court applies Chevron, the “agency win rate” is 76.2%. 
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1142.  Agencies prevail 66% of the time when no 
deference regime is invoked. Id. 
  Congress set a 
Skidmore-level standard for courts reviewing preemption 
decisions from the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, and  
 
116 Barnett & Walker, supra note 52, at 31. 
117 Pierce, supra note 52, at 1314 (“Can, and should, the Supreme Court 
establish for the first time a legal regime in which it tells lower courts to do as we 
say and not as we do?”). 
118 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 52 at 68 (“Mead’s focus on delegation and 
formality, unsurprisingly, has a firm grasp on the circuit courts.”). 
119 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 87, at 732. 
120 Id. at 739. 
121 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2018). 
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maintained a Chevron “savings clause,” indicating Congress 
acted in reliance on its assumption that courts will apply 
Chevron by structuring legislation around it.122
De novo review would reorder the logic of actors across the 
entire federal government, removing a cornerstone of 
administrative law that, with the exception of its use by the 
Supreme Court, functions as intended.  The solution to the 
perceived separation of powers problem, then, is not to reject 
deference, but to embrace it.  If the Court shifts interpretations 
towards a more nuanced understanding of the dynamic Congress-
agency relationship, drafters would be better able to predict how 
legislation and interpretation might fare in judicial review.
 
123
IV. THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER POST-ENACTMENT 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
 
The Chevron framework already gives courts the means to 
construe statutes according to the will of Congress and address 
illegitimate exercises of agency authority.  Chevron incorporates 
some form of de novo judicial review by first discerning whether 
the statute is ambiguous.124  The United States Supreme Court, 
encouraged by Justice Scalia, has increasingly taken a textualist 
approach at Chevron Step One.125  This method directly 
correlates to the decline in the application of Chevron.126
 
122 Barnett, supra note 56. 
  
Limiting the available interpretive tools not only deprives courts 
of vital context for the statute, but also impractically freezes the 
statute at the time of enactment.  Instead, courts should stand in 
the shoes of the agency breathing life into a statute through 
enforcement and undertake a more flexible statutory 
interpretation. 
123 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 87, at 766–67. 
124 Emily Hammond, Four Flaws of the Proposed Separation of Powers 
Restoration Act, 41 A.B.A. SEC. OF ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 9 (2016). 
125 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 351, 363–65 (1994). But see Eskridge & Baer, supra note 29, at 1136 (“[T]here 
can no longer be serious debate whether Supreme Court precedent instructs judges 
to consider relevant legislative history in applying Chevron deference. It does.”). 
126 Merrill, supra note 125, at 366. This might also account for the disparity of 
application of Chevron doctrine between the Supreme Court and circuit courts. 
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Chevron tells the Court to “give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”127  Legislative history explains the 
specifically expressed will of Congress.  Legislative history “can 
aid the judge in understanding how the legislation’s 
congressional proponents wanted the statute to work, what 
problems they sought to address, [and] what purposes they 
sought to achieve. . . .”128  To prevent agency overreach and 
uphold the meaning of the statute, the Court should consider 
legislative history as a means to affect the will of Congress in a 
way “that respects the general integrity of [congressional] 
processes (while mindful of the possibilities of manipulation).”129
Critics of using legislative history in Chevron interpretations 
argue that if statutory ambiguity “signals a congressional 
delegation to the agency charged with implementing the statute, 
then a court’s use of legislative history to specify the terms of 
that delegation—to narrow the scope of statutory discretion—
contradicts the very point of the statute.”
 
130  First, it is important 
to acknowledge that legislative histories must be read with some 
skepticism and afforded weight according to their context and 
content; not all materials are of the same caliber in offering 
insight into legislative intent or purpose.131
 
127 Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
  Second, this 
criticism presumes that external sources would force a judge to 
read a statute more narrowly than the limits of each word as 
explored through textualism.  That idea is undermined by the 
Court’s current use of textualism to “reduc[e] the range of 
possible statutory meanings, and thus reduc[e] the occasions on 
128 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 35 (Oxford University Press, 
2014) (“Legislative history can be especially valuable when construing a specialized 
term or phrase in statutes dealing with complex matters beyond the ordinary ken of 
the judge.”). 
129 Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain 
Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 266 (1998) (arguing that legislative 
histories are critical to the interpretive process). 
130 John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1517, 1542 (2014). For a general overview of criticisms of the use of legislative 
histories, see KATZMANN, supra note 128, at 39–42. 
131 See James J. Brudney, Lecture, Faithful Agency Versus Ordinary Meaning 
Advocacy, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 975, 993 (2013) (“[S]tanding committee and 
conference committee reports traditionally are accorded the most 
weight . . . . Explanatory floor statements by bill or amendment sponsors receive 
almost as much attention . . . . Conversely, the Court considers statements by bill 
opponents and also subsequent legislative history to be unreliable.”). 
AR2_BALDWIN 9/10/2018  12:41 PM 
2018] ENDANGERED DEFERENCE 113 
which reference to agency views is appropriate.”132  Third, 
agencies themselves rely on legislative history in developing 
their interpretations.133  While some might argue that the Court 
and agencies operate in “divergent normative contexts” and thus 
necessarily rely on different sources of authority in their 
interpretations,134
Post-enactment legislative history in particular is critical to 
agency-related statutory interpretation where agencies receive 
signals from and construe statutes in accordance with the 
preferences of the current, not the enacting, Congress.
 it does not benefit the reviewing court to 
foreclose interpretive resources available to and utilized by the 
agency when determining whether the agency is acting within its 
scope of authority.  Finally, this criticism ignores the possibility 
that the Court could use legislative history to corroborate, not 
foreclose, the ambiguity of a statute. 
135  While 
post-enactment legislative history could be an important 
interpretive tool, the Court, in most instances, currently rejects 
it.136
Subsequent legislative history has two main forms: 
congressional resolutions and legislative acquiescence.  The 
Court largely ignores resolutions,
 
137 which are meant to influence 
political actors with a majority vote of one or both houses of 
Congress.138
 
132 Merrill, supra note 125, at 366. 
  Without bicameralism and presentment—
significantly, the signature of the head of all executive agencies—
resolutions are particularly susceptible to partisan politics, and 
133 Supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
134 Jerry Mashaw, Exploring Agency Statutory Interpretation, 31 A.B.A. SEC. OF 
ADMIN. L. & REG. PRAC. 7 (2006) (“Courts have long been viewed as rights-
protecting, institutional brakes, while executive agencies are institutional 
accelerators.”). 
135 See supra Part III.A. 
136 See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995); Haynes v. United States, 
390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4 (1968) (“The view of a subsequent Congress of course provide 
[sic] no controlling basis from which to infer the purposes of an earlier Congress.”); 
Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573, 609 (2008) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” (quoting United States v. 
Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960))). 
137 See, Gersen & Posner, supra note 136, at 609–10. Because courts do discern 
post-enactment legislative intent from congressional resolutions, Congress does not 
often utilize them. Id. at 612. 
138 Id. at 578–79.  
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are therefore not regarded as trustworthy indicators of legislative 
intent.139
By contrast, the Court sometimes pays credence to 
legislative acquiescence, “a presumption about legislative views 
on the basis of congressional inaction or congressional action that 
has multiple interpretations.”
 
140  This presumption is strongest 
when Congress’s inaction follows vigorous debate by Congress 
and the public, and where “there is reason to regard the failure of 
the legislature to act as evidence of the correctness of the 
interpretation.”141  Saliently, Congress pays close attention to 
statutory interpretation in civil rights cases, and is more likely to 
exercise “restorative overrides,” where it “ ‘restores’ what it 
considers the correct understanding of the statutory 
scheme . . . . ”142
Critics of acquiescence argue that “inaction does not contain 
the same guaranties as action.”
  In essence, acquiescence allows an agency’s 
prior interpretation to gain deferential status in the event 
Congress does not take affirmative legislative action to abrogate 
the agency’s reading as affirmed by the Court. 
143  Congress could fail to enact a 
statute for any number of reasons that do not indicate its 
approval of a given interpretation.144
 
139 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of 
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1523 n.304 (2000) (noting that because 
the bill passage process encourages some degree of partisan restraint, by 
comparison, “[p]ost-enactment legislative history seems especially likely to be 
strategic rather than truly descriptive of congressional intent”). 
  Additionally, some 
standards for applying acquiescence are ambiguous.  For 
example, it is unclear when an interpretation becomes 
“longstanding,” and how rigorously a topic should be debated 
before the Court is comfortable allowing the absence of action to 
140 Gersen & Posner, supra note 136, at 610. 
141 Jill Schlick, Administrative Law—The Fourth Circuit Strikes Down the 
FDA’s Tobacco Regulations, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 741, 754–55 (1999). 
142 Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional 
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 1317, 1319–20 (2014) (listing as examples of restorative overrides the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009). 
143 Schlick, supra note 141, at 756–57 (claiming a lack of political accountability 
where Congress can change the law by doing nothing). 
144 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) 
(“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally 
tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that 
the existing legislation already incorporated the offered change.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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stand in for Congress’s will.145
Nevertheless, the benefits of utilizing acquiescence to 
determine intent outweigh the drawbacks.  Acquiescence would 
increase, not decrease, political accountability by burdening 
legislators with the duty to respond to interpretations.  
Moreover, a widespread use of this presumption, like a 
widespread use of deference, creates a predictable backdrop for 
legislators and agencies alike.
  These blurry boundaries could 
have the unintended effect of allowing courts to manipulate the 
tool in conformity with their own intent, rather than Congress’s. 
146
To illustrate this point, the following analysis applies post-
enactment legislative history to Zarda to reimagine the strength 
of the agency deference argument the Second Circuit avoided.  At 
the outset, given the evolution of Civil Rights Act jurisprudence, 
it strains credulity to assert that the term “sex” in Title VII is 
unambiguous on its face.
  Legislators understand the 
consequences of failing to abrogate interpretations with which 
they disagree, and can measure their responses accordingly.  
Agencies, knowing that they are more likely to prevail in their 
interpretation the longer it is utilized without contest, might 
cater policies toward a longer aim, potentially with a more 
restrained effect that Congress would find less incendiary. 
147  Here, Chevron Step One requires a 
searching inquiry to define the outer boundaries of that 
ambiguity.  The scant legislative history that accompanies this 
act is not illuminating.148
 
145 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1864–65 (2015) (advocating to define longstanding as at 
least ten years because it requires the interpretation to be on the books for more 
than one presidential administration). 
  Using post-enactment legislative 
history, the court would focus its Step One analysis on Congress’s 
dynamic interpretation of Title VII, looking for any indication  
 
146 See supra Part III.C. 
147 See Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 386 (2015) 
(acknowledging the EEOC changed its construction of “sex” to include gender 
identity since plaintiff filed the case, and remanding to the District Court to assess 
the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (allowing a claim for same-sex 
harassment under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) 
(recognizing a Title VII claim on the basis of sex for discrimination for failure to 
conform to sex stereotypes). 
148 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (describing the 
last-minute amendment that added “sex” to Title VII, leaving interpreters with 
“little legislative history to guide us”). 
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that once Congress was apprised of the EEOC’s definition 
inclusive of sexual orientation, it reacted with legislative action 
to narrow the definition of sex. 
Congress may have been aware of the interpretation of sex 
as sexual orientation as early as 2002, when a federal district 
court in Oregon held that “[t]he protections of Title VII are not 
limited to heterosexual employees only” where a lesbian woman 
stated a claim for sexual harassment based on nonconformity to 
gender stereotypes.149  At the very least, Congress should have 
recognized the EEOC’s interpretation of “sex” in 2015, when it 
decided Baldwin v. Foxx.150  In 2003, the Supreme Court began 
weaving a tapestry of protection in sexual orientation 
discrimination cases.151
In light of the legal and cultural focus on LGBTQ rights, it is 
without question that the public has engaged in vigorous debate 
on the issue of sexual orientation discrimination.  Congress has 
definitively joined the fray, as evidenced by a recent proposal for 
sweeping legislation to address LGBTQ rights and protections.
  Congress must have noticed the 
evolution of the status quo on the Court and in society towards a 
more inclusive definition, which would necessarily alert Congress 
to the opportunity to abrogate a broader interpretation. 
152  
While the Second Circuit dismisses arguments advocating for 
subsequent legislative developments put forward by amici,153 it 
only cites to the Department of Justice’s argument that the 
consistent introduction and failure of legislation that “expressly 
prohibit[s] sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace 
[means that] Congress has implicitly ratified decisions holding 
that sexual orientation was not covered by Title VII.”154
 
149 Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. 
Or. 2002). 
  Far from 
seeking to reassert a contrary definition, Congress sought to 
explicitly codify the EEOC’s interpretation of “sex” in the 
150 Supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
151 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 
570 U.S. 744 (2013); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 349–50 
(7th Cir. 2017) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). See also Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., No. 15–3775  slip op., at 66 n.33 (2d Cir, Feb. 26, 2018) (en 
banc) (“[T]here has been a sea change in constituional framework governing same-
sex marriage.”). 
152 See Equality Act, H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. (2017). 
153 Zarda, slip op., at 59. 
154 Id. at 62. 
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proposed Equality Act using a “belt and suspenders” method.155  
The bill’s 240 co-sponsors reiterate the new status quo of broad 
inclusion of LGBTQ rights in existing legislation,156 showing that 
Congress is an active partner in continuously reshaping 
background norms.  Instead of “ratif[ying] by silence”157 and 
interepretation that precludes Title VII protection for gay 
workers, Congress evinces a robust rights-protective purpose in 
their consistent attempts to offer coverage to gay employees.  In 
its most recent iteration, Congress’s underwriting of an agency 
decision shows harmony and alignment of interpretation in both 
policy-making branches, a persuasive statement that bolsters 
deference to the EEOC decision.158  Should the Equality Act fail, 
it is unlikely that the EEOC’s new definition of sex, adjudicated 
in 2015, will be “longstanding” enough to merit accepting 
Congress’s silence as action for the decision before the Second 
Circuit.159
Once the reviewing court finds an ambiguity left to the 
agency to construe, it then looks to the reasonableness of the 
agency’s interpretation.  In Baldwin, the EEOC held that 
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised on 
sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or 
  However, given the intensity of public attention and 
debate, a court might accept a shorter timeframe, combined with 
the fact that the only proposed legislation reacting to the EEOC’s 
interpretation sought to codify Baldwin as sufficient to evince 
ambiguity. 
 
155 Equality Act, H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. § 2(a)(9) (2017); Brief Amici Curiae of 
Four Members of Congress in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 11–
12, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2017) (No. 15-3775). 
156 See Lopez, supra note 13. Certainly, this bill cannot represent the unanimous 
will of Congress, nor is it enacted law. 
157 Zarda, slip op., at 63. 
158 See Ethan J. Lieb & James J. Brudney, Legislative Underwrites, 103 VA. L. 
REV 1487, 1491, 1498–99 (2017) (describing “an express legislative endorsement of a 
judicial reading of a statute” as potentially a form of “supercharged precedent,” but 
acknowledging that while “[o]ne can certainly make a case for considering 
underwites of agency decisions,” including adjudications, the additional complexities 
of that endeavor are beyond the scope of that Article). 
159 The EEOC may, however, be able to assert acquiescence for an eventual 
Supreme Court case, assuming its definition remains consistent.  The Chevron Court 
accounted for an agency’s changing policy priorities, and accepted that 
interpretations would not remain fixed over time.  See Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
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norms,”160 placing it squarely within prior precedent disallowing 
discrimination for nonconformity with gender stereotypes.  The 
EEOC also analogized sexual orientation discrimination to the 
long-standing protection against discrimination of individuals in 
interracial relationships.161  Moreover, while the 1964 Congress 
might not have intended for Title VII to protect sexual 
orientation, the EEOC noted that “statutory prohibitions often go 
beyond the principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions 
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators 
by which we are governed.”162
Where, as here, post-enactment legislative history evinces 
agreement among Congress and an agency on a permissible 
interpretation of a pre-existing statute, that definition should 
stand.  Legislative history, including subsequent legislative 
acquiescence to agency interpretation, promotes a stable and 
consistent administrative state by placing policy decisions in the 
hands of politically accountable actors.
  Based on this expert analysis that 
benefitted from decades of the EEOC’s administering Title VII 
and broad national perspective on discrimination in the 
workplace, the EEOC should not only be permitted to reasonably 
evolve the definition of the statutes it enforces, but also be 
afforded deference for its decisions.  As such, the Second Circuit 
should overturn its prior caselaw and adopt the EEOC’s 
interpretation of “sex” as inclusive of sexual orientation. 
163
CONCLUSION 
 
A stronger deference doctrine will increase predictability in 
the promulgation of laws and uniformity in their enforcement.  
Furthermore, Chevron is the single most recognizable doctrine in 
administrative law, and legislators and interpreters, including 
 
160 Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 
(July 16, 2015). 
161 Id. at *6 (“[A]n employment action based on an employee’s relationship with 
a person of another race necessarily involves considerations of the employee’s 
race. . . .”). 
162 Id. at *9 (quoting Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 
(1998)). 
163 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret 
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 417 (arguing that society needs “predictability, 
expertise, and democratic legitimacy” for a successful legal system). 
AR2_BALDWIN 9/10/2018  12:41 PM 
2018] ENDANGERED DEFERENCE 119 
circuit courts, rely on deference to inform their work.  A 
consistent application of Chevron doctrine emboldened by an 
expanded use of legislative histories will unify methodologies of 
statutory interpretation to help to eliminate the politicization of 
judicial opinions in administrative law. 
Without agency deference, LGBTQ employees like Donald 
Zarda will not know if they have protection from being fired for 
their sexual indentity.  Their protection in the workplace may 
vary from state to state, as judges displace the well-reasoned 
interpretation offered by the agency charged with administering 
Title VII legislation.  Even where the Second Circuit found a 
rights-protective doctrine within Supreme Court precedent of 
analogous cases, its repeated reliance on the framework and 
argument of the EEOC decision without explicitly crediting its 
persuasive or deferential value undermines the credibility and 
transparency of the judiciary and risks the perception that 
politics drove its decision. 
Supporters of SOPRA are willing to exchange limited agency 
power for enhanced judicial activism, an opposite but not equal 
strain on separation of powers.  It is not sufficient to claim that 
the President does not exercise sufficient oversight over 
administrative agencies to count them as democratically 
accountable.  By comparison, judges have practically no oversight 
and a lifetime tenure.  Additionally, a President’s use of agencies 
to promote a specific agenda is not a per se violation of 
separation of powers.  Finally, though SOPRA claims that de 
novo review would force tighter legislative drafting, there is no 
indication that Chevron doctrine was promoting sloppy 
legislating.  Indeed, even with the most careful drafting, losing 
the ability to know how a statute would be interpreted and to 
what extent it would withstand scrutiny would be akin to losing 
the ability to know if coming out puts one out of a job.  Neither 
are for the judge alone to decide. 
 
